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NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local
340: Abolition of the Reservoir Doctrine In Union
Unfair Labor Practice Cases
The seductive plausibility of single steps in a chain of evolutionary development of a legal rule is often not perceived until a third, fourth, or
fifth "logical" extension occurs. Each step, when taken, appeared a
reasonable step in relation to that which preceded it, although the aggregate or end result is one that would never have been seriously considered in the first instance. This kind of gestative propensity calls for
the "line drawing" familiar in the judicial, as in the legislative process:
"thus far but not beyond." 1
Unions are generally free to discipline their members by expulsion, fine, or
other penalty for any conduct that violates a valid union rule. 2 When discipline
is imposed on a union member who holds a supervisory position with his company, the employer may challenge the legality of that discipline. The basis of the
employer's challenge is that the union is attempting to restrain the employer
from choosing the disciplined supervisor as the employer's bargaining representative in violation of section 8(b)(1)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act
3
("the Act").
In NLRB v. InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 340
(IBEW)4 the United States Supreme Court ruled on the legality of union disciplinary action against one of its members when that member's employer had no
current bargaining relationship with the Union. The Court sharply "drew the
line" on the evolutionary development of the construction of section 8(b)(1)(B)
by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). After the decision in IBEW,
an employer may no longer use section 8(b)(1)(B) to charge a union with unfair
labor practices unless the employer is currently engaged in a bargaining relationship with that union. The Supreme Court's restriction on the use of this provision abolished the long-standing NLRB "reservoir doctrine," under which the
Board or reviewing courts had recognized that present union conduct might
effectively coerce an employer's future selection of its bargaining representative
in violation of section 8(b)(l)(B).
This Note examines the development of the reservoir doctrine in section
8(b)(1)(B) cases and analyzes the Supreme Court's abolition of the doctrine in
IBEW. It concludes that the Court's rejection of the doctrine was incidental
rather than integral to the holding in IBEW, and was inconsistent with prior
judicial construction of section 8(b)(1)(B). The Note further concludes that the
1. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 340, 107 S. Ct. 2002, 2016-17 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123,
127 (1973)).
2. T. KEELINE, NLRB AND JUDICIAL CONTROL OF UNION DISCIPLINE 95 (1976).
3. Section 8(b)(1)(B) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents ... to restrain or coerce ... an employer in the selection of his representatives for the
purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1982).
4. 107 S.Ct. 2002 (1987).
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legislative intent of section 8(b)(l)(B)-to protect against union attempts at co-

ercing the employer in his choice of a bargaining representative-will not be
fully realized under the Supreme Court's narrow construction of the provision.

In 1982, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 340
("the Union") fined two of its members,5 Albert Schoux and Ted Choate when it

found them guilty of violating the Union's constitutional prohibition against
working for any employer who did not have a collective bargaining relationship
with the Union. The Union Constitution forbade members to " '[w]ork for, or
on behalf of, any employer whose position is adverse or detrimental to the
[Union].' ",6 Schoux's employer, Royal Electric Company, and Choate's employer, Harold E. Nutter, Inc., were both electrical contractors, who at the time
of the IBEW violations had adopted a collective bargaining agreement negoti-

ated by their multi-employer unit with a rival union.7 In response to the fines
Royal Electric and Nutter filed unfair labor practice charges against the IBEW,

claiming that the imposition of the fines had restrained or coerced the employers
in their selection of the disciplined employees as bargaining representatives, and
8
thus violated section 8(b)(l)(B).

The NLRB adopted the administrative law judge's evidentiary findings 9

that both employees were "supervisors" within the definition of section 2(11) of
the Act.10 Thus, under the reservoir doctrine, both employees were prospective

bargaining representatives within the purview of section 8(b)(1)(B). 1 Under the
reservoir doctrine, the NLRB and the courts had recognized that supervisors-

as part of a "reservoir" from which the employer is most likely to choose his
future bargaining

representatives-are

"representatives"

under

section

8(b)(1)(B). 12 The Board additionally found that, even without resort to the reservoir doctrine, one of the fined employees was a bargaining representative
5. Schoux and Choate were fined $8,200 and $6,000, respectively. A third Union member,
Melvin Miller, was fined $7,683.20 for a similar violation. The Board rejected his employer's subsequent § 8(b)(l)(B) complaint on the ground that Miller did not hold a supervisory position-a precondition to finding a § 8(b)(1)(B) violation-at the time of the discipline. Royal Elec. Co., 271
N.L.R.B. 995, 998 (1984), enforcement denied, NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local
340, 780 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2002 (1987).
6. IBEW, 107 S. Ct. at 2005 n.1 (quoting the Union Constitution).
7. Royal Electric, 271 N.L.R.B. at 996.
8. IBEW, 107 S. Ct. at 2005.
9. Royal Electric, 271 N.L.R.B. at 995, 996-97, 998. In an unfair labor practice case, once a
charge has been filed with and investigated by the Board's regional office, the General Counsel issues
a complaint on behalf of the complaining party. K. McGuINEss & J. NORRIs, HOW TO TAKE A
CASE BEFORE THE NLRB §§ 12.4, 12.10, 15 (5th ed. 1986). An administrative law judge conducts a
hearing on the complaint and drafts a written decision, in accordance with Board precedent, on the
evidence presented. Id. §§ 16.1, 17.1. The Board may adopt, reject, or modify the evidentiary findings and legal conclusions and recommendations of the judge. Id. § 17.11.
10. Section 2(11) of the Act defines a "supervisor" as follows:
[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or
responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend
such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a
merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1982).
11. Royal Electric, 271 N.L.R.B. at 997-98.
12. See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
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under section 8(b)(1)(B) because of his ongoing responsibility of handling personal grievances.1 3 The Board upheld the administrative law judge's legal con-

clusion that because the foreseeable and intended result of the fines was the
employee's resignation, the employer, consequently deprived of his representa-

tive's services, was restrained and coerced in his selection of that representative
4
in violation of section 8(b)(1)(3).1
The Board petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit for enforcement of its "cease and desist" order against the Union.15 The
court of appeals denied enforcement of the order on the grounds that union
discipline could not constitute a section 8(b)(l)(B) violation when the union did

16
not seek to represent the complaining company's employees.

The Supreme Court in IBEW affirmed the appellate court's refusal to enforce the Board's injunctive order against the Union. 17 The Supreme Court first
determined that the employees were not representatives under section 8(b)
(1)(B).

18

The Court maintained that because union discipline of a supervisor-

member would only result in a section 8(b)(1)(B) violation when that discipline
would "adversely affect" the supervisor's future performance of his collective
bargaining and/or grievance adjustment functions,1 9 representative status required current engagement in those functions. 20 This "current engagement" re13. The Board established that Schoux granted employees time off and resolved personal complaints and problems regarding job assignments. See Royal Electric, 271 N.L.R.B. at 997.
14. Id. at 995, 1000.
15. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 340, 780 F.2d 1489, 1490 (9th Cir.
1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2002 (1987). Section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act empowers
the Board to petition the United States Court of Appeals in the circuit in which the unfair labor
practice occurred for enforcement of its order. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982). The Board's order additionally required the Union to rescind and expunge from its records all disciplinary action taken
against Schoux and Choate, and to post a notice of the Board's order at its business office and
meeting halls. Royal Electric, 271 N.L.R.B. at 1003.
16. IBEW, 780 F.2d at 1492-93. The court of appeals deferred to the Board's findings of fact
regarding the employee's representative status. Id. at 1491-92. In deciding the case, the court of
appeals applied the rule promulgated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in a prior decision:
"[W]hen a union does not represent or intend to represent the complaining company's employees
there can be no Section 8(b)(1)(B) violation when a union disciplines members even if they are
designated bargaining representatives." Id. at 1492 (citing NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, Local 73 (Chewelah Contractors, Inc.), 714 F.2d 870, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1980), denying
enforcement of 231 N.L.R.B. 809 (1977)).
IBEW's collective bargaining agreement with the employers' bargaining group had expired 17
months prior to the first disciplinary action. Royal Electric, 271 N.L.R.B. at 995, 996-98. Fourteen
months before that disciplinary action, the Union sent a letter to the multi-employer bargaining unit
to which Schoux and Choate's employers belonged, disclaiming any interest in representing the
unit's employees. The Board found that this disclaimer of interest was part of a Union scheme to
represent these employees and to induce employers within the bargaining unit to bargain individually with the Union. See id. at 999-1000. The Ninth Circuit rejected this finding as "logically insupportable," and held that the Union's "discipline of [its] members fully a year after the termination of
the bargaining relationship between the Union and the employers cannot reasonably be construed as
an effort to restrain or coerce the employer." IBEW, 780 F.2d at 1492-93.
17. IBEW, 107 S. Ct. at 2015.
18. Id. at 2011-12. In his dissenting opinion in IBEW, Justice White maintained that the issue
of Schoux and Choate's representative status was not properly before the Court because the Board
had prevailed on that issue at the appellate level and therefore did not raise the issue in its petition
for certiorari. Id. at 2017 n.1 (White, ., dissenting).
19. Id. at 2010; see also id. at 2008-09 (discussing history of adverse effect standard).
20. Id. at 2010.
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quirement is blatantly inconsistent

with any doctrine that recognized

representative status based solely on a supervisor's potential ability to undertake
collective bargaining. The Court thereby rejected use of the reservoir doctrine as

a mechanism for finding that employees can be section 8(b)(1)(B) representatives.

21

The Court in IBEW further held that the current engagement requirement
precluded the finding of a section 8(b)(1)(B) violation when the Union did not
currently have or seek to establish a collective bargaining relationship with the
employer. 22 The Court rejected the employers' argument that the Union's discipline in this instance would "restrain" the employer by reducing the pool of
willing supervisors from which the employer might choose its bargaining representatives. The Court instead contended that the legislative intent behind section 8(b)(1)(B) was not "to prevent enforcement of uniform union rules that may
occasionally have the incidental effect of making a supervisory position less desirable."' 23 The Court reasoned that without a collective bargaining agreement,
the adverse effects on the manner of the supervisor-member's fulfillment of his
prospective representation duties, if any, would be "too speculative" to support a
finding of an unfair labor practice.24 Absent such an agreement, there would
also be no incentive for the Union to attempt to coerce the employer's selection,
the danger contemplated by the protections of section 8(b)(1)(B). 25
As the Supreme Court noted in IBEW, section 8(b)(1)(B) was enacted to
protect the integrity of the grievance adjustment and collective bargaining
processes by placing restraints on unfair union labor practices. 26 The provision
21. Id. The IBEW Court also suggested that the Board's reliance on Schoux's personal grievance adjustment duties as an alternative basis for finding representative status did not constitute a
proper reading of "grievance adjustment" within § 8(b)(1)(B). Id. at 2012 n.12.
22. Id. at 2012-13. Justice Scalia did not join in this portion of the majority's holding. In his
concurring opinion, he stated,
[I]n my view it does not matter whether the Union intended to represent Royal or Nutter;
and if it did matter, I would find inadequate basis for overturning the Board's factual
finding of representational intent. I would affirm the Court of Appeals solely on the
ground that the Union had no collective-bargaining agreement covering either Royal or
Nutter.
Id. at 2015 (Scalia, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 2013.
24. Id. at 2012. In his dissenting opinion, Justice White objected to the majority's interpretation of the legislative intent of § 8(b)(1)(B), and to the majority's exclusive focus on the adverse effect
of union discipline on the supervisor's subsequent performance of his representative duties: "By its
plain language, § 8(b)(1)(B) protects an employer's right to select grievance adjustment and collective-bargaining representatives, and does not merely ensure that union control does not affect the
manner in which a selected representative thereafter performs his or her duties." Id. at 2017 (White,
J., dissenting). Justice White cited the prior Supreme Court decision in American Broadcasting Co.
v. Writer's Guild, 437 U.S. 411 (1978), in which the Court approved the Board's disposition of a
claim "virtually identical" to the claim in IBEW, as evidence of the continued viability of
§ 8(b)(1)(B) liability when discipline affects a supervisor's willingness to serve as a collective bargainer or grievance adjuster. IBEW, 107 S. Ct. at 2018 (White, J., dissenting) (citing New Mexico
Dist. Council of Carpenters & Joiners of America (A.S. Homer, Inc.), 177 N.L.R.B. 500 (1969),
enforced, 454 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1972)).
25. IBEW, 107 S. Ct. at 2012.
26. Id. at 2015; see 93 CONG. REc. 3837 (Apr. 23, 1947) (statement of Senator Taft).
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was enacted in 1947 as one of the Taft-Hartley amendments 27 to the Wagner

Act. 28 Under the Wagner Act, labor practice regulations were limited solely to

employer conduct, and were designed to protect union organization and collective bargaining from unfair employer influence. 29 Unions flourished under the
protections of the Act, 30 and prior to the Taft-Hartley amendments, often
abused their influence. This abuse took the form of demanding that employers
bargain through representatives preselected by and presumably predisposed to
the interests of the union, that employers bargain only through a multi-employer

bargaining group, and that employers terminate supervisors whom the union
31
determined were too harsh on its members.

The Board and courts of review adopted a two-part inquiry for use in applying section 8(b)(1)(B) to cases involving union disciplinary action such as the
imposition of fines in IBEW. 32 The Board or the reviewing court inquired, first,

whether the disciplined supervisor-member was a "bargaining representative"
under section 8(b)(1)(B) and, second, whether the disciplinary action restrained
and coerced the employer in his selection of that representative. 33 The reservoir
doctrine, which stated that a supervisor within the meaning of section 2(11) of
the Act 34 was part of the "logical reservoir" from which an employer was likely
to select its collective bargaining and grievance adjustment representatives,

35

inquiry.3 6

emerged as a means for the Board to satisfy both parts of this
The National Labor Relations Board has consistently relied on the reservoir doctrine in an effort to recognize representative status in those employees
who, although lacking current grievance adjustment duties, enjoyed a level of
27. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 8(b)(1)(B), ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1982)).
28. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)).
29. Section 1 of the Wagner Act cites as the impetus for its enactment the "denial by employers
of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining," and asserts that "protection by law of the right of employees to organize and
bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption... by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes." Id. § 1.
30. See 93 CONG.REc. 3582 (1947) (statement of Congressman Mackinnon on need for legislative amendment to Wagner Act).
31. See 93 CONG. RIc. 4143 (1947) (statement of Senator Ellender).
32. Union disciplinary action against a supervisor-member may constitute "indirect" coercion
of the employer in his selection of that supervisor as its bargaining representative. For a discussion of
both the Board's and the Supreme Court's initial application of § 8(b)(1)(B) solely to claims of "direct" union coercion, and the evolution of that application to encompass claims of indirect coercion,
see Florida Power & Light Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 417 U.S. 790, 798-802 (1974);
Comment, Section 8(b)(1)(B), NationalLabor RelationsAct: When Does Union Discipline Constitute
Restraint or Coercion of the Selection of Employer Representatives?, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 866, 869-73.
33. See, eg., Erie Newspaper Guild, Local 187 v. NLRB, 489 F.2d 416, 419-20 (3d Cir. 1973)
(applying two-part test to § 8(b)(1)(B) claim arising from union discipline of strike breaking
supervisors).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1982).
35. IBEW, 780 F.2d at 1491.
36. The Board's decision in Toledo Blade Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 1072, 1079 (1969), enforced, 437
F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1971), has been credited with the creation of the doctrine. See Erie Newspaper
Guild, 489 F.2d at 420.
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supervisory contact with fellow employees. 3 7 Under this definition of "representative," which included supervisors who were "vested with theoretical power" to

become the employer's representative, 38 the Board could address the second part
of the section 8(b)(1)(B) inquiry by ascertaining whether the union's conduct

restrained or coerced the employer contrary to its right to rely on the availability
39
of these supervisors to serve as representatives when the occasion arose.

The Board's steadfast adherence to the reservoir doctrine in assessing section 8(b)(1)(B) claims was first shaken by the Supreme Court's decision in Flor-

ida Power & Light Co. v. InternationalBrotherhood ofElectrical Workers.4° The
Court in FloridaPower held that union discipline of a supervisor-member who
crossed a picket line to perform the rank-and-file work of striking employees was
not a section 8(b)(1)(B) violation.4 1 The Court promulgated a new standard for

reviewing the legality of union discipline: A union's discipline of one of its members who is a supervisory employee can constitute a violation of section
8(b)(1)(B) only when that discipline may adversely affect the supervisor's conduct in performing the duties of, and acting in his capacity as, grievance adjuster
or collective bargainer on behalf of the employer. 42 According to a subsequent
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 43 the
FloridaPower standard effectively undermined the conceptual basis of the reser-

voir doctrine by mandating current engagement in collective bargaining activities as a prerequisite to finding reresentative status. 44 The Board disagreed with

the Second Circuit's interpretation of the effect of FloridaPower on the viability
of the reservoir doctrine. 45 Nonetheless, the NLRB began to present alternative

grounds for finding representative status-usually by applying a broad definition
of "grievances" handled by the disciplined supervisor-in cases in which 4it6
would previously have asserted only the application of the reservoir doctrine.
37. See Northwest Publications Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 778, 779 n.6 (1982); Detroit Free Press, 192
N.L.R.B. 106, 110 (1971); Toledo Blade, 175 N.L.R.B. at 1079.
38. Cork Insulating Co. of Wis., 189 N.L.R.B. 854, 857 (1971). Some courts, including the
Supreme Court in IBEW, 107 S. Ct. at 2006, have stated the doctrine as automatically granting
representative status to all § 2(11) supervisors. The Board, however, has traditionally required the
employer to present "credible evidence" that the supervisor is part of a class from which management naturally might seek its representative. See Erie Newspaper Guild, 489 F.2d at 420-22; Detroit
FreePress, 192 N.L.R.B. at 110; Cork Insulating, 189 N.L.R.B. at 857. But see Royal Palm Dinner
Theatre, Ltd., 275 N.L.R.B. 677, 682 n.8 (1985) (dictum granting representative status automatically by virtue of supervisory rank).
39. See Toledo Blade, 175 N.L.R.B. at 1079.
40. 417 U.S. 790 (1974).
41. Id. at 803-05.
42. Id. at 804-05.
43. NLRB v. Rochester Musicians' Ass'n Local 66, 514 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1975).
44. Id. at 992-93.
45. See generally Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 283 N.L.R.B. No. 114 (Apr. 24, 1987) (available on LEXIS) (discussing Board's continued adherence to reservoir doctrine after RochesterMusicians' Ass'n, 514 F.2d at 992-93).
46. See, e.g., id. (asserting supervisor's grievance adjustment duties as alternate grounds for
representative status); Hulse Elec., 273 N.L.R.B. 428, 439 (1984) (stating that even without resort to
reservoir doctrine, supervisor was § 8(b)(1)(B) representative because of handling of employee complaints and personal conflicts); Suburban Sheet Metal Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 523, 526 (1984) (supervisor
authorized to resolve employee disputes and problems is § 8(b)(1)(B) representative without solely
relying on reservoir doctrine); see also Pride Elec. Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. No. 8 (Feb. 26, 1987) (noting
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Four years after FloridaPower, the Supreme Court's decision in American

BroadcastingCo. v. Writers GuildofAmerica 4 7 did little to support the assertion
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that the reservoir doctrine was no longer

a viable mechanism for bringing supervisors within the purview of section
8(b)(l)(B). The Court in American Broadcastingadopted the FloridaPower "ad-

verse effects" test in assessing a claim that union discipline of a supervisor-member who elected to cross a picket line to perform supervisory work constituted

illegal coercion of the employer.4 8 The American Broadcasting Court also recognized, however, that "[s]ection 8(b)(1)(B) obviously can be violated by attempting coercively to control the choice of the employer's representative,
before, as well as after, the representative has actually dealt with the grievance." 49 If FloridaPower did in fact undermine the conceptual basis of the doctrine by requiring a supervisor's current engagement in representative functions,
American Broadcastingarguably reinstated the basis of the reservoir doctrine by

judicial recognition that prospective representative status fell within the realm of
section 8(b)(1)(B). 5 0 American Broadcasting's reinstatement of the doctrine,
though, was arguably limited to instances in which a supervisor had previously
been authorized to perform grievance adjustment duties. 51

Although the reservoir doctrine has retained some vitality in finding representative status under section 8(b)(l)(B), the Board and the courts have not cited
the reservoir doctrine per se in finding that union conduct coerced the employer
in his selection of a bargaining representative in violation of section 8(b)(1)(B).
Still, the conceptual basis for the doctrine has appeared as the rationale in many
cases for such a finding, most notably those cases in which the defendant union
tendency of Board to interpret "grievance" broadly in applying § 8(b)(l)(B)); Desert Inn Hotel,
Country Club & Spa, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 65 (Sept. 10, 1986) (citing Supreme Court decision in NLRB
v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 832 n.9 (1984), for support of reliance on broad definition of "grievance" in finding § 8(b)(l)(B) violation).
47. 437 U.S. 411 (1978) (holding that threats of discipline as well as the imposition of union
discipline on supervisor-member for crossing picket line to perform supervisory duties violated
§ 8(b)(l)(B)).
48. See id. at 430. The American BroadcastingCourt applied the "adverse effect" test to gauge
the effect of the union discipline on the manner in which the supervisors subsequently performed
their grievance adjustment duties. Id. at 432-35. For a comparison of the Court's application of the
test with its original application in FloridaPower, see Comment, Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the National
Labor RelationsAct and Union Discipline of Supervisor-MembersAfter Writers Guild: Equipoise or
Imbalance?, 1978 S. ILL. U.L.J. 453, 462-74.
49. American Broadcasting,437 U.S. at 427 n.25. This recognition was the basis for the Court's
holding that, in addition to the actual imposition of union discipline on strike breaking supervisors,
the mere threat of discipline, which disauded many supervisors from reporting to work, constituted a
§ 8(b)(1)(B) violation by depriving the employer of "the opportunity to chose these particular supervisors as his collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment representatives." Id. at 432. The Court
noted that both the disciplined supervisors and the supervisors who were restrained from reporting to
work were authorized and available to adjust grievances when and if the occasion arose. Id. at 427
n.25, 431-32.
50. See NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers (Drexel), 703 F.2d 501, 504-05 (11th
Cir.) (citing American Broadcasting as support for holding that discipline of supervisor "deprived"
employer of potential bargaining representative and therefore violated § 8(b)(l)(B)), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 950 (1983); see also IBEW, 107 S. Ct. at 2013 n.15 (noting as dictum and disavowing the
American Broadcasting Court's recognition of coercion when supervisor was subsequently unwilling
to serve as representive).
51. See American Broadcasting,437 U.S. at 427 n.25, 431-32, 435.
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did not currently have a collective bargaining agreement with the complaining
company.

The Court in American Broadcasting,for example, recognized that union
pressure which affects the supervisor's willingness to serve in a grievance adjust-

ment or collective bargaining capacity "impermissibly coerces the employer in

his choice of representative." 52 In support of this interpretation of section
8(b)(1)(B), the Court cited the nine-year-old National Labor Relations Board
decision in New Mexico District Council of Carpenters& JoinersofAmerica (A.S.

Homer,Inc.).5 In A.S. Homer the Board held that the imposition of a fine on a
supervisor-member would violate section 8(b)(1)(B), notwithstanding the absence of a current collective bargaining agreement between the employer and
union. 54 A violation occurred because compliance with the union's demands
would require the employee to leave his job and thereby deprive the employer of
the services of its selected representative. 5" Buoyed by the American Broadcasting Court's endorsement of the decision, 56 the Board has continuously adhered
to A.S. Homer,57 and has found additional support in decisions of the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh, 58 Fifth, 59 Seventh, 6° and District of
Columbia Circuits. 61 Despite such widespread support, the A.S. Homer rationale has been criticized in some jurisdictions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in NLRB v. InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 436.
177 N.L.R.B. 500 (1969), enforced, 454 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 502.
Id.
American Broadcasting,437 U.S. at 436 n.36.

57. See, eg., Valley Mechanical, Inc. 281 N.L.R.B. No. 89 (Sept. 22, 1986) (§ 8(b)(1)(3) violation when union disciplined member who worked for company with whom union did not have or
seek a collective bargaining relationship); Royal Palm Dinner Theatre, Ltd., 275 N.L.R.B. 677, 683
(1985) (union discipline of supervisor violated § 8(b)(1)(B) in absence of collective bargaining relationship between union and employer); Hulse Elec., 273 N.L.R.B. 428, 440 (1984) (union discipline
of supervisor-member for working for nonsignatory employer violates § 8(b)(1)(3)); West Coast
Contractors, 254 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1126-27 (1981) (dictum citing A.S. Horner as controlling in
§ 8(b)(1)03) cases when union does not represent complaining company's employees); Chewelah
Contractors, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 809 (1977) (§ 8(b)(1)(B) violation for union discipline of supervisor
when union did not currently seek to represent employer's employees), enforcement denied, 621 F.2d
1035 (9th Cir.), amended on reh'g, 714 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1980); Skippy Enterprises, Inc., 218
N.L.R.B. 1063, 1064 (1975) (citing A.S. Homner in support of finding § 8(b)(1)(B) violation for union
discipline for infraction of "no contract no work" rule), enforced, 532 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1976); see
also Suburban Sheet Metal Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 523, 526 (1984) (applying A.S. Homer rationale to
find § 8(b)(1)(B) violation only when evidence showed that union sought to represent the company's
employees); Bergelectric Corp., 271 N.L.R.B. 25 (1984) (§ 8(b)(1)(B) violation when discipline
would have effect of "depriving the [c]ompany of its chosen supervisors").
58. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers (Drexel), 703 F.2d 501, 504-07 (11th Cir.)
(union discipline of member for working as supervisor for nonunion employer violated §
8(b)(1)(3)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 950 (1983).
59. International Longshoreman's Ass'n v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 554, 560-61 (5th Cir. 1976), (find-

ing § 8(b)(1)(B) violation when rival supervisor's union picketed to pressure employer to replace

current union), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 828 (1977).
60. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 2150, 486 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir.

1973) (§ 8(b)(1)(B) violation for union discipline of supervisor who reported to work during strike
occurring after expiration of bargaining contract with employer), vacated, 418 U.S. 902 (1974).

61. International Longshoreman's Ass'n, Local 1740 v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 1271, 1274 (D.C. Cir.

1973) (finding § 8(b)(1)(B) violation by union who picketed employer to pressure discharge of employer's representatives, who were members of a rival union), cera denied, 416 U.S. 956 (1974).
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Workers, Local 73 (Chewelah Contractors,Inc.), 62 rejected the rationale of A.S.
Homer. The same court that would reject use of the reservoir doctrine as a basis
for finding illegal restraint in IBEW noted that when a union neither has nor
sought a collective bargaining relationship with the employer, union discipline of
that employer's supervisor-members did not represent coercion under section
8(b)(1)(B).6 3 In these instances, the court of appeals noted that the union had
no incentive to influence the employer's choice of a representative, nor did it
have the power to affect the representative's subsequent loyalty to that
employer.64
IBEW brought to an abrupt halt the prolonged judicial disagreement over
the relative impact of Florida Power and American Broadcasting when current
union conduct resulted in section 8(b)(1)(B) claims of wholly prospective restraint and coercion of an employer's choice of bargaining representative.65
Under IBEW, union discipline of a supervisor-member will now constitute a
section 8(b)(1)(B) violation only when that discipline has been imposed for an
act or omission that occurred while the member was engaged in collective bargaining, grievance adjustment, or some other closely related activity. 66 The
IBEW Court explained that this standard derived from the "implicit" limitations the FloridaPower Court placed on permissible applications of its "adverse
effects" test.6 7 In allegiance to this standard as the exclusive basis for finding a
section 8(b)(1)(B) violation, as well as in deference to what it deemed the legislative intent behind the scope of the provision, the IBEW Court maintained that it
was obligated to abolish the reservoir doctrine. 68 With this abolition, the Court
overruled, in whole or in part, almost twenty years of Board decisions that had
relied to some degree on the doctrine to find that a supervisor had the requisite
representative status to sustain his employer's section 8(b)(1)(B) claim. 69 De62. 714 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1980), denying enforcement of 231 N.L.R.B. 809 (1977)).
63. Id. at 871-72.
64. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 73 (Chewelah Contractors, Inc.), 621
F.2d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir.), amended on reh'g, 714 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1980).
65. The Supreme Court granted certiorari for the express purpose of resolving this issue. See
IBEW, 107 S. Ct. at 2007 & n.4.
66. Id. at 2010.
67. Id. at 2008-09.
68. Id. at 2010.
69. See, e.g., Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 283 N.L.R.B. No. 114 (Apr. 24, 1987) (available on
Lexis) (asserting supervisor's grievance adjustment duties as alternative grounds for establishing representative status); Desert Inn Hotel, Country Club & Spa, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 65 (Sept. 10, 1986)
(supervisor who sporadically handled grievances as representative without solely invoking reservoir
doctrine); Royal Palm Dinner Theatre, Ltd., 275 N.L.R.B. 677, 682 & n.8 (1985) (citing supervisor's
handling of employee complaints and grievances, along with reservoir doctrine, in determining representative status); Hulse Elec., 273 N.L.R.B. 428, 439 (1984) (holding that even without reservoir
doctrine, supervisor's handling of personal complaints and conflicts were sufficient to establish him
as representative under Board's broad interpretation of § 8(b)(1)(B) "grievance"); Suburban Sheet
Metal Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 523, 526 (1984) (supervisor authorized to resolve employee disputes is §
8(b)(1)(B) representative without relying solely on reservoir doctrine); Northwest Publications Co.,
263 N.L.R.B. 778, 779 n.6 (1982) (reliance on reservoir doctrine to establish fined supervisor's representative status), enforced, 730 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1984); Detroit Free Press, 192 N.L.R.B. 106, 110
(1971) ("[A] substantial supervisor who is responsible for the day-to-day performance of employees
in his area is a management representative within Section 8(b)(l)(B)."); Toledo Blade Co., 175
N.L.R.B. 1072, 1079 (1969) (representative status in supervisors authorized to adjust grievances
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spite the apparent logic of its rationale, the IBEW Court's dismissal of this longstanding NLRB doctrine appears cavalier. The Court admitted it was not necessary to reject the Board's grounds for finding Schoux and Choate's representative status to dispose of the case. 70 It was, therefore, unnecessa y for the Court
71
to reject application of the reservoir doctrine.
The Court's exclusive recognition of the FloridaPower standard in section
8(b)(1)(B) cases similarly precluded future application of the conceptual basis
for the reservoir doctrine as a means of finding restraint and coercion. 72 The
IBEW standard gauges restraint and coercion only by the degree of change in
the representative's subsequent performance of the same collective bargaining
functions that led to the disciplinary action. Application of this standard, therefore, prohibits the finding of a section 8(b)(1)(B) violation in two situations.
First, no violation would occur if the employer had no collective bargaining
relationship with the union. 73 Second, the IBEW standard prohibits finding a
violation in any case in which the employer claims-as the employer successfully claimed in American Broadcasting-thatthe union's conduct restrained the
employer's selection of a bargaining representative by effectively limiting the
pool of supervisors available, willing, and qualified to perform those services. 74
The IBEW Court may have correctly interpreted the scope of the test created and applied in FloridaPower. Its reliance on that test as the exclusive standard for finding a section 8(b)(1)(B) violation and as a consequence its disavowal
of the broader standard espoused in American Broadcasting,however, may have
been inappropriate. The Florida Power Court considered the possible coercive
effect of union discipline of an employer's preselected bargaining representative,
which was imposed for the representative's performance of nonsupervisory duties during a strike. That Court's inquiry, and the scope of the test it promulgated to address that inquiry, was appropriately limited to an assessment of the
circumstances under which discipline of a supervisor-already selected and currently engaged as a bargaining representative-might effectively restrain the employer in that selection by causing the representative to modify the manner in
"even if it were found that neither [supervisor] then had or exercised such authority"), enforced, 437
F.2d 55 (1971).

70. See 1BEW, 107 S. Ct. at 2012 n.12.
71. See id. at 2015 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I find it unnecessary (as should the Court) to reach
the 'reservoir doctrine' question .... ); id. at 2017 n.1 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that issue of
employees' representative status not properly before the Court since not raised in petition for

certiorari).

72. The IBEW Court adopted the FloridaPower "adverse effect" test and its "implicit" limitation to application in cases in which "an employer-representative is disciplined for behavior that
occurs while he or she is engaged in § 8(b)(1)(B) duties." Id. at 2008. This limitation is inconsistent
with the conceptual basis of the reservoir doctrine, which recognizes that any union discipline which
affects the willingness or availability of the employer's supervisors to serve eventually as a bargaining
representative coerces the employer's choice of representative in violation of § 8(b)(1)(B). See supra
text accompanying notes 43-44.
73. See IBEW, 107 S. Ct. at 2012.
74. The IBEW Court characterized this portion of the American Broadcasting decision as dictum, id. at 2013 n.15, and disavowed the prior decision's recognition of coercion resulting from the
discipline of a supervisor while engaged in nonrepresentative functions, id. at 2010 n.8. Butsee infra
notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing that portion of American Broadcastingdecision as
integral to Court's holding).
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which he subsequently performs his representative duties. 7 5

In American Broadcastingthe Supreme Court considered, as it had in Florida Power, the coercive effect of discipline of incumbent bargaining representa-

tives on the subsequent performance of their duties. Another issue raised in
American Broadcasting was whether an employer was coerced when the threat

of union discipline dissuaded a supervisor vested with grievance adjustment authority from working altogether during a strike, thereby depriving the employer
of a potential bargaining representative. 76 The American Broadcastingstandard,

which recognized illegal coercion when union pressure on supervisors affected
either their willingness to serve as grievance adjusters or the manner in which

they fulfilled those functions, 77 did not represent a departure from the Florida
Power test. Rather, the American Broadcasting standard was a necessary exten-

sion of that test to address an additional section 8(b)(1)03) claim-the type of
78

claim at issue in IBEW.
The IBEW Court explained its disavowel of the American Broadcasting
standard on the grounds that the effect of union discipline on an employer's
prospective choice of bargaining representatives is "minimal" 79 and "too speculative" 80 to have been contemplated by Congress in its formulation of section
8(b)(1)(B) protections.8 1 This criticism failed to consider that Congress intended section 8(b)(l)(B) protections to extend not only against union conduct
75. FloridaPower, 417 U.S. at 804-05; see also NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers
(Drexel), 703 F.2d 501, 504 (1lth Cir.) (characterizing the issue in FloridaPower as whether the
court should extend § 8(b)(1)(B) protection to the employer whose supervisor is disciplined for performing nonrepresentative duties), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 950 (1983).
76. See American Broadcasting, 437 U.S. at 431-32; see also NLRB v. International Bhd, of
Elec. Workers (Drexel), 703 F.2d 501, 504 (1lth Cir.) (citing American Broadcastingas holding in
part that union pressure kept supervisors from reporting to work violated § 8(b)(l)(B) by depriving
employer of opportunity to choose those supervisors as representatives) (quoting American Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. at 436 n.36), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 950 (1983); IBEW, 107 S. Ct. at 2018
(White, J., dissenting) (discussing the dual issues of supervisor availability and manner of performance in American Broadcasting).
77. See American Broadcasting,437 U.S. at 436.
78. The Supreme Court in both American Broadcasting and IBEW addressed claims of union
coercion when union discipline dissuaded a supervisor vested with grievance adjustment authority
from reporting to work. See IBEW, 107 S. Ct. at 2018 (White, J., dissenting). Application of the
American Broadcastingstandard to the facts ofIBEW may, however, yield a different result. Unlike
the supervisors in IBEW, 107 S. Ct. at 2005, the supervisors in American Broadcasting were dissuaded from working during a strike, 437 U.S. at 413. This situation created a more imminent need
for the services of the employer's bargaining representative.
79. IBEW, 107 S. Ct. at 2013-14.
80. Id. at 2012.
81. The Court also distinguished the holding in American Broadcasting on the ground that
currently, in light of a post-American Broadcastingdecision ensuring a union member's freedom to
renounce union membership at any time, there is no longer any actual coercive effect of supervisormember discipline. Id. at 2015 (citing Pattern Makers v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985)). The dissent in
IBEW challenged this distinction by noting that restrictions placed by unions on renouncement of
membership was not a pivotal basis of the holding in American Broadcasting. Id. at 2019 (White, J.,
dissenting). The American Broadcasting Court, in fact, rejected the argument presented by the
Writer's Guild that union discipline was not a § 8(b)(I)(B) violation because the employer could
avoid the alleged coercion of its choice of representation by legally compelling an employee to renounce union membership prior to the employee's promotion to a supervisory position. American
Broadcasting,437 U.S. at 437. The Court noted that a contrary holding could not be reconciled with
its prior decision in FloridaPower. Id.
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that actually coerces the employer in its choice of representatives, but also

against union attempts at such coercion, whether or not such attempts
82
succeed.

The Supreme Court suggested that its holding in IBEW might have been
different if the Union had been seeking to represent the complaining company's
employees.8 3 It is possible that the IBEW standard would not, however, allow
the finding of a section 8(b)(1)(B) violation in this instance. The standard re-

quires that the discipline, to be illegal, must be imposed while the supervisor is
engaged in his representative capacity, which may require the existence of a cur84
rent collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the union.
The standard appears inadequate when applied to these facts because union incentive to influence an employer's selection of bargaining representation would
be no less pronounced, and perhaps even more pronounced, on the eve of establishing a bargaining agreement than after that agreement is in place.8 5

The Court in IBEW emphasized the legislative intent of section 8(b)(1)(B)
as a rationale for dismissing the American BroadcastingCourt's recognition of

prospective restraint and coercion.8 6 Given such an emphasis, it is particularly
questionable why the IBEW Court nonetheless adopted the FloridaPower stan-

dard for finding violations of the statute. A review of the legislative history of
82. See 93 CONG. REc. 4143 (1947) (according to statement of Senator Ellender, "[S]ubsection
8(b)()(B)... makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to attempt to coerce an employer either in
the selection of his bargaining representative or in the selection of a... supervisory official."). See
generally Florida Power, 417 U.S. at 798-99 (citing with approval historical applications of
§ 8(b)(1)(B) and characterizing them as "attempts" to influence selection of representatives). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in applying the "restraint and coercion"
language of § 8(b)(1)(A), focused its inquiry on the motive or purpose of the union conduct. See
Baltimore Rebuilders, Inc. v. NLRB, 611 F.2d 1372, 1378 (4th Cir. 1979) (citing Local 357 Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 675 (1961)), cerL denied, 447 U.S. 922 (1980).
The IBEW Court in fact recognized that a union's coercive purpose (as opposed to effect) in
selectively enforcing a facially uniform union rule might violate § 8(b)(1)(B). See IBEW, 107 S. Ct.
at 2012 n.13 (citing dictum in NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 73 (Chewelah
Contractors, Inc.), 714 F.2d 870, 872, denying enforcement of 231 N.L.R.B. 809 (1977)). Under the
IBEW current engagement standard, however, the proposition that selective enforcement of union
rules might constitute a § 8(b)(1)(B) violation is not viable if the employer has no current collective
bargaining relationship with the union. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
83. See IBEW, 107 S. Ct. at 2012 (citing the Union's lack of incentive to influence choice of
bargaining representative when union does not seek to establish bargaining relationship with employer as grounds for inapplicability of § 8(b)(1)(B)); see id. at 2015 (Scalia, J., concurring) (declining to join majority because of its recognition of the Union's intent to represent employees as a factor
in determining applicability of § 8(b)(1)(B)).
84. The IBEW Court did not decide whether "grievance adjustment" order § 8(b)(1)(B) is limited to disputes over application of the collective bargaining contract. The Court did observe, however, that the FloridaPower Court embraced a very limited definition of the term. Id. at 2012 n.12.
If § 8(b)(l)(B) duties do not encompass the adjustment of personal grievances, satisfaction of the
IBEW standard mandates a current collective-bargaining agreement. See id. at 2010 ("Clearly a
supervisor cannot be disciplined for acts or omissions that occur during performance of § 8(b)(l)(B)
duties if he or she has none."). The impossibility of this suggestion is evident when one considers
that the IBEW Court embraced a definition of § 8(b)(1)(B) "grievance adjustment" that included
only disputes over application of the contract. Id. at 2012 n.12.
85. Cf NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 73 (Chewelah), 621 F.2d 1035
(9th Cir.) (recognizing potential for §'8(b)(1)(B) violation when union seeks to represent complaining company's employees without constraints of IBEW standard), amended on reh g, 714 F.2d
870 (9th Cir. 1980).
86. IBEW, 107 S. Ct. at 2013.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

section 8(b)(1)(B) reveals little support for construing the provision as a protective measure against anything except direct union attempts to coerce an em-

ployer's choice of bargaining representative. 87 The Florida Power standard
limited but did not extinguish the potential for a section 8(b)(1)(B) violation
when a union indirectly tries to coerce the employer in its choice of a representative by disciplining its supervisor-member. The legislative intent of section
8(b)(1)(B) therefore provides no greater support for the FloridaPower standard
than for the standard adopted in American Broadcasting.

Judicial line-drawing may indeed have been merited as a response to the
Board's increasingly liberal interpretation of section 8(b)(1)(B).

88

Nevertheless,

the IBEW Court, by abolishing the reservoir doctrine, has "drawn the line" in
the wrong place. The Court neglected to acknowledge what may be the primary
intent of section 8(b)(1)(B) by its refusal to recognize the American Broadcasting
standard's protection against prospective coercion. Both the text of section
8(b)(1)(B) and legislative explanation of its scope referred to coercion in the
"selection" of an employer's bargaining representative.8 9 This language connotes section 8(b)(1)(B) applicability to any union conduct occurring prior to the
employer's actual naming of a bargaining representative and prior to that supervisor's performance of any collective bargaining or grievance adjustment duties.

This language, in addition, appears reasonably susceptible to the FloridaPower
Court's interpretation that a union may coerce an employer's selection by necessitating the removal of an incumbent representative. 90 This interpretation, however, should not prevail to the exclusion of an interpretation that the statute

protects against union coercion prior to, or at the time of, the employer's selection of a representative. 91
87. The Senate Report described the import of § 8(b)(1)(B) as not allowing a union to "dictate"
who shall represent the employer, or "to compel" the removal of a supervisor who has been delegated the function of settling grievances. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1947). See
IBEW, 107 S.Ct. at 2008 (describing Oakland Mailers, 172 N.L.R.B. 2173 (1968), as extending
§ 8(b)(1)(B) by prohibiting indirect coercion); id. at 2012 n.13 (noting that direct coercion of a supervisor's selection will always be a § 8(b)(1)(B) violation).
The provision need only protect against direct attempts at coercion because an employer can
effectively protect against a union's indirect attempts at coercion by requiring its employees to renounce union membership prior to their promotion to supervisory positions. See American Broadcasting, 437 U.S. at 437; see also supra note 81 (assessing the IBEW Court's treatment of the
possibility of renouncing union membership as a factor in determining § 8(b)(1)(B) violations).
88. The restrictive FloridaPower standard was developed in response to the evolution of the
Board's and the Court's application of § 8(b)(1)(B). What began as a narrow proscription became a
"general prohibition" against union disciplinary action, which was both imposed as a result of the
manner in which the supervisor-member performed his grievance adjusting, collective bargaining, or
any of his other supervisory functions, and imposed in an effort to influence the manner in which
that supervisor subsequently performed his § 8(b)(1)(B) duties. See FloridaPower, 417 U.S. at 80002. The Board's application of § 8(b)(1)(B) to claims of union coercion when discipline has been
imposed-other than for the manner in which the supervisor-member performs his duties-in an
effort to affect the willingness of the supervisor subsequently to serve as bargaining representative,
has similarly developed into a general prohibition against union discipline. A § 8(b)(1)(B) violation
may occur even when the union has no interest in representing the complaining company's employees. See cases cited supra note 57.
89. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1947); 93 CONG. REc. 4143 (Apr. 28, 1947).
90. See 93 CONG. REC.3837 (Apr. 23, 1947) ("[E]mployees cannot say to their employer, 'We

do not like Mr. X, we will not meet Mr. X. You have to send us Mr. Y.' ")
91. American Broadcasting recognized the incidence of illegal coercion occurring both prior
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Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion in IBEW, accused the majority of
"construing not the statute but its own construction. Applied to an erroneous
point of departure, the logical reasoning that is ordinarily the mechanism of

judicial adherence to the rule of law perversely carries the Court further and
further from the meaning of the statute." 92 The IBEW Court does appear to

have applied its reasoning to "an erroneous point of departure" from the original intent of section 8(b)(1)(B) by its continued recognition of a union's indirect

coercion of an employer as a potential violation of the statute. 93 Even ifjustified
in recognizing indirect coercion as a section 8(b)(1)(B) violation, the Supreme
Court in IBEW made several such departures in abolishing the reservoir doctrine. The Supreme Court's exclusive espousal of the restrictive FloridaPower
standard and its misapplication of that standard to an unrelated fact situation,
its disregard for the legislative foundations of the American BroadcastingCourt's
extension of that standard to encompass claims of prospective coercion in a case
analogous to IBEW, and its allowance in section 8(b)(1)(B) inquiries for emphasis solely on the probable effects of union conduct rather than on the intent of
that conduct, have earned it Justice Scalia's admonition.
PATRICIA CRAMER JENKINS

and subsequent to the actual naming of a bargaining representative and performance of that representative's duties. 437 U.S. at 436; see supra text accompanying note 49.
92. IBEW, 107 S. Ct. at 2016 (Scalia, J., concurring).
93. See id. at 2012 n.13 (distinguishing situations that necessitate application of the Court's
standard from the imposition of absolute liability for direct coercion).

